Working Papers

Experimental Auctions with Securities (with Allan Hernández-Chanto and Declan Hunt)

Delegation with Continuation Values

Why Do We Procrastinate? Present Bias and Optimism (with Matthew Gibson and Jeffrey Shrader) Revise and Resubmit, The Economic Journal

Revealing Risky Mistakes through Revisions (with Paul Feldman) Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

Biased Contest Judges (with Gregory Kubitz)

Revealed Preference Tests for Linear Probability-Prize Tradeoffs (with Paul Feldman)

Work in Progress

Bidding According to GARP (with Paul Feldman)

Competing Sellers in Experimental Auctions with Securities (with Allan Hernández-Chanto and Elliot Hiller)

Norm Enforcement in Coordination Games (with Kate Green and Vera te Velde)

How Decision Quality Changes within Experiments (with Guanting Du)

Published & Forthcoming

Breig, Zachary. “Repeated contracting without commitment.” Journal of Economic Theory 204 (2022): 105514.

Breig, Zachary, and Mitch Downey. “Agency breadth and political influence.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 188 (2021): 253-268.

Breig, Zachary. “Prediction and Model Selection in Experiments.” Economic Record 96, no. 313 (2020): 153-176.

Breig, Zachary. “Endogenous and exogenous commitment.” Economics Letters 183 (2019): 108577.